## Exhibit M

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                  IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
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                                     C.A. NO. 03-440
       UNILOC USA, INC., et al
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       VS.
                                     FEBRUARY 27, 2009
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                                     10:26 A.M.
       MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
8
       et al
                                     PROVIDENCE, RI
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               BEFORE THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SMITH
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                             DISTRICT JUDGE
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                (Daubert Hearing/Motions in Limine)
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       APPEARANCES:
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                               PAUL J. HAYES, ESQ.
       FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:
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cross-examine Mr. Napper, he'll deal with them, fine.

But I don't want you to take it at face value because I don't think it's productive for me to go through every document that Mr. Hayes put up and show you chapter and verse why none of those means what he says they mean, okay? Except to say that there's another side to the story there, which they're entitled to bring out.

THE COURT: All right. Well, we need to wind this up. So I don't know if you want to say a few words about Gemini. But, I mean, I've read your brief. I understand your argument here. Gemini is an easier challenge in the sense that it is -- it's a pretty straightforward question. I mean, it's this rule of thumb, and you're saying it doesn't stand up to 702 in Daubert, and there's never been a serious analysis done on that, and, you know, Mr. Hayes is saying it's been used for a thousand years.

MR. SCHERKENBACH: Right.

THE COURT: And, you know, this isn't the time to throw it out. I understand the issue.

MR. SCHERKENBACH: There's a -- and, Your Honor, I won't go over that again. We've talked about the 25% part, but there's actually a very important -- oops, excuse me -- second part to the motion on Mr. Gemini

that has nothing to do with the 25% rule. And, frankly, if you're inclined to just let that one go because it's been used in other cases, albeit without challenge, you know, so be it.

But there -- in this case, whatever you think of the 25% rule, Mr. Gemini's theory can't go to the jury because it rests on a fundamental assumption that's just wrong. There's absolutely no evidentiary basis for it.

I'm projecting here the magic sentence from this product support services memo -- I have it up on your screen, if you want to see it --

THE COURT: Yep.

MR. SCHERKENBACH: Okay. This memo, and specifically Page 25 of this memo, under Security, two sentences, I guess, this is the heart of his analysis, and it's completely bogus, okay?

THE COURT: Yeah, this is the 10-\$10,000, okay.

MR. SCHERKENBACH: Yes, this is the 10-10,000 issue. Obviously, it was briefed in detail, so I'm not going to go over everything that's in the brief. But, in round numbers, you have a man who -- well, first of all, they studiously avoided asking the relevant witnesses what this really meant in deposition, plain and simple, okay? Because they know it doesn't mean

what that Microsoft document means? He's not, okay? And it doesn't matter whether the document itself is independently admissible or any of that. All those arguments by them are just misdirection.

They have to lay the foundation that somebody -that there's some evidence that somebody thought these
numbers were reflective of the value of product
activation, and there is absolutely none.

THE COURT: Well, there's the words themselves.

I mean, that's the problem you have. Now, I -- you know, somebody at Microsoft wrote this.

MR. SCHERKENBACH: Right.

THE COURT: Obviously, they weren't thinking of this case when they wrote it, but they wrote what they wrote, and so the plain meaning of the words, Product key is worth anywhere between \$10 and \$10,000, depending on usage, I mean --

MR. SCHERKENBACH: The product key.

THE COURT: Right. But the product key -- I mean, a reasonable reading of the product key is product activation. It's under the term, Security,

I'm not disputing that he's wrong. You may be able to show that he's wrong, but you're saying how is he entitled to say that, that's what this means? Well, I think he can just read it and conclude that it means

what it says. You might be able to show that he's being clever, but it does say what it says.

MR. SCHERKENBACH: Well, I mean, arguing with you, I know it's going to get me nowhere, but I mean, it -- a document that's written before product activation exists that talks about a product key? I mean, I don't see that. I mean, it would be one thing if they had some evidence somewhere from some witness that made that link, but they don't.

And whether it's a reasonable argument or not even isn't actually even the point. It's a fundamental failure, as a factual matter, as an evidentiary matter, to link -- to try to link this up.

They could have asked Ms. Richards, hey,
Ms. Richards, I know you said you don't know much -never mind the fact that she said she didn't know
anything about product activation, they could have
asked her, they could have said, Ms. Richards, isn't it
fair to read this to suggest that the value of product
activation, as used in Microsoft Office, was 10 to
\$10,000?

I know for sure what she would have said, but they could have asked her. They could have asked Jim Harkins that question. They could have deposed the other people on the face of the memo, they could have